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Social Security Taxation When Benefits are Tied to Contributions
Abstract
There is a substantial body of literature addressing the issue of optimal Social Security taxation. The most
common theme in this literature concerns the optimal Social Security tax in a growing economy. For example,
papers by Diamond (1965), Samuelson (1975), and Hu (1979) demonstrate that a Social Security tax can
alter the private sector's saving behavior. As such, Social Security can be used as a policy tool to change the
economy's capital/labor ratio and the economy's growth path. The optimal Social Security tax is that which
brings about the most preferred growth path. For an economy in which no growth occurs, it is often argued
that Social Security cannot improve upon the performance of the private economy, Actuarially fair programs
will simply replace private saving; actuarially unfair programs will produce distortions within the economy.
However,.in Enders and Lapan (1981), we derived the optimal Social Security tax for a stationary economy in
which all agents have rational expectations.
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POWER AND EMPLOYMENT
•by
Roy Gardner
No. 118
^Preliminary findings, not to be quoted without permission of the author.
In any economic system, but especially in centrally planned economies,
there exists an important interaction between the political structure and
the economic outcome. In a society like that of the Soviet Union, there
are considerable differences in power among the various segments of society.
These differences in power lead to the existence of economic classes, not
unlike those in capitalist economies.^ The difference in economic outcome
in such circumstances can be striking. During the 1920's the Soviet Union
experienced substantial unemployment among the industrial labor force,
with unemployment rates exceeding 10?^. At the same time, an industrial
worker or employee who belonged to ihe Communist Party had between 1 and 4^.
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chance of being unemployed. This paper constructs an explanation of this
fact.
The model constructed portrays the spoils system, first referred to by
Senator Marcy of New York in 1832: "To the 'd-ctor belong the spoils." We
consider a game played on two levels. The game on the first level describes
the struggle among groups for political pov/er. The game on the second level
describes how a coalition which wins the political struggle distributes jobs.
Spoils here means access to jobs, as controlled by a winning coalition.
The solution of each game is given by the Shapley value, which measures a
player's expected value from playing in the game. The Shapley value
provides insight into many questions of economics,^ and its role here is to
formalize the connection between political power and the distribution of
employment.
Tliis decomposition of the employment allocation process into games on
two levels is valid whenever the political and economic systems are closely
linked, as in the Soviet Union. Resides distributing goods like jobs,
hovever, one can also imagine reverse spoils systems which distribute
bads like involuntary armed service. If resistance to tlie draft is
futile, there is a duality between the spoils system and its reverse:
the probability of getting a job and the probability of avoiding the
draft are the samej when the unemployment rate equals the draft quota.
Tn this way, one simple model explains two important politically-based
forms of privilege in the Soviet Union: access to jobs and avoidance of
arned service.
I. Model of the Spoils Game
Society N consists of n agents, numbered 1 through n. A coalition S
is any subset of N.
The political structure of society is described by the set of winning
coalitions W. A winning coa3j.tion rules the society if it forms. It seems
reasonable to irepose the following three conditions on the political struc
ture. First, the society itself is winning, N belongs to W. This is one
expression of the Pareto condition. ^Second, if the coalition S is winning,
the countercoalition N-S is nob. Two groups cannot both rule simultaneously.
Finally, if S is winning, any coalition that contains S is winning. A winning
coalition does not lose strength by growing larger. A coalition is minimal
winning if it contains no subset which is itself winning. Minimal winning
coalitions cannot afford any defections and still rule. Such coalitions
turn out to play a special role in the model.
An individual player i has a veto if he belongs to every winning coalition.
flo coalition can win without him. Player i is a dictator if he is himself
a winning coalition. This constitutes the strongest form of veto power.
There can be at most one dictator, but there can be several players with
veto power. V/hen VJ = , and only the grand coalition rules, then every
player has a veto power.^
The characteristic function game on the political level, v^, takes the
form
Vj.(S) = 1 if 3 is winning
0 otherwise.
Player i's marginal contribution to coalition S is the difference between
what S can do with as opposed to without him:
v^(Sv^ {i} ) - v^(S).
If S is losing with and without player i, then his marginal contribution
is 0-0 = 0. If S is winning both with and without player i, then his
marginal contribution is 1 - 1 = 0. If S wins with player i and loses
without him, then his marginal contribution = 1-0 = 1, In the latter
case, player i is called pivotal.
The Shapley value of player i in a .game v, '}'v(i), is the expected value
of player iVs marginal contribution. This expectation is taken over random
orders of the set of players, with all random orders equally likely. For
the game Vj just defined, the Shapley value is the probability that a
player is pivotal. The greater a player's Shapley value, the more lilcely
he is to count in a winning coalition. For instance, (l)v(i) = 1 when i
is a dictator. On the other hand, when a player i is never pivotal, his
Shapley value is zero. Vj(i) varies v/ithin these extremes, with total power
equalling one:
n
<t>V (N) = Z !|)V-r(i) = 1.
i=l
For these reasons, the Shapley value is often interpreted as a measure of
political power.
The game at the economic level, portrays the allocation of job
slots in the economy. Suppose each job is,indi^'isibleJ each player can fill
at most one job, and that there are k jobs in total available to the economy,
k 5 n. The number of available jobs is exogenous to the power structure.
Rcn-irdloss of which winning coalition forms, Jc cannot increase or decrense
the job total. Within this limitation, a winning coalition S with s members
can divvy up jobs as it sees fit. There are two possibilities. One is that
'c < s, in wliich case S can guarantee its members Ic jobs. The other is that
k s, in which case S can guarantee all its members jobs. On the other hand,
a losing coalition cannot assure its members of any jobs. If each match
of a coalition member and a job counts for one, then a coalition playing
the spoils game can assure its members of Vj^ jobs , where
Vj^(S) = ...in (kjs) when S is winning
0 otherwise.
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II. Job Probabilities for the Spoils Game
One of the bad things about unemployment is that it tends not to be
distributed evenly. The main idea of this paper is that the uneven.^distri
bution of employment is a direct reflection of power differences. To see
this, we need to take a close look at the Shapley value for the economic level
game This again represents player i's expected marginal contribution
to a coalition. Alternatively, the Shapley value is the probability that
player i gets a job.
To begin with, there are three possible marginal contributions. If S
loses with and without i, then i's marginal contribution is zero. He is
merely contributing excess labor to a losing, hence jobless, coalition. If
S IS winning, but k <: s, then i*s marginal contribution is again zero. He
is bringing labor to a winning coalition, but all job slots are already filled.
If S is winning and s < k, then i's marginal contribution is one. His marginal
contribution oi' labor now fills a slot. Finally, if S loses without i and
wins with i, then i is pivotal and his marginal contribution is min(k,s+l).
All the members of S their jobs to i's having joined. One attaches
probabilities to these possibilities via the random order hypothesis, taking
into account the power structure defined a.t the political level. Player i's
expected value from plajring the employment game is simply his probability of
getting a job, based on his political role.
The interpretation of the Shapley value just given requires that ^Vjj(i) <1,
This need not always be the case, but violations can be handled by Shapley's
device of ^ formalizing the interpretation of
,|,Vii(i) >1 as meaning that i is sure to get a job. Suppose that i's filling
a job slot counts for instead of 1. Let S be v/inning. Then i's marginal
contribution is if 3 has slots available and Xi"^ otherwise. If i is
pivotal, his marginal contribution is s + Define the game v^^ to reflect
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this:
v^^(S) = min (s,k) if S1 winning and i not in S
^ if S is winning and i in S
0 otherwise.
Finally, Xj_ is determined by the condition
1 Xi = (i).
X
Player i's expected marginal contribution in the game V is X. tin,es his
X
probability of getting a job, where the latter probability is 1.
',le will adapt a notation to handle both these Shapley values. Let
denote the probability that player i has a job, given that the number of jobs
is k. The vector x(k) of job probabilities as given by the Shapley value is
tlius the main theoretical interest of the paper. Indeed, we shall trace out
the path of x(k), 33 k varies from 0 to n. Several observations about x(k)
can be made immediately. For k = 0, then x^(k)= 0. When there are no jobs,
there is no probability of getting a job for any player i. For k = 1,
x^(l) = 'i'Vj(i). The rationing of the only job in the economy identically
reflects the distribution of political power. For k = n, x^(k) = 1 for all
i. Vj'hen there are jobs for everybody, then everyone .^.cts a job, regardless
of power differentials. The in-between cases, 2 .< k < n, require more
work.
Job rabioning is uniform when x^(k) =k/n for all i. "ot surprisingly,
this occurs vjhen the distribution of power is even. Take for examp3.e the
3-player .majority-rule game. Any coalition with two or more players is
vjinning. The distribution of power is (l/3,l/3il/3) • When there are two
jobs available, each player's expected marginal contribution is l/3(2),
since each pivots with probability 1/3 and a coalition with two members
fills two jobs. The resulting x(k) is depicted in figure la.
Even for 3-player games, there can exist substantial power differentials.
Suppose any majority is winning, as long as it includes player 1. Then
player 1 has veto pov;er, although he is not a dictator. The distribution
of power io (4/6,1/6,1/6). The probabilities of employment are depicted in
figure, lb. Player 1 is much more likely to be employed, and in fact is sure
of a job when k = 2.
Pov;erless players can also arise when n = 3. Suppose that any majority
that contains both players 1 and 2 is winning. Both 1 and 2 have a veto power,
while player 3 is powerless. The latter is never pivotal. The distribution
of power then is (l/2,l/2,0)« The only time player 3 has a chance for a job
is when there is full employment. Players 1 and 2 are sure of jobs when k = 2.
Figure Ic depicts this set of outcomes x(k). Thus, one already sees in the
case of 3-player games the dramatic impact of power difierentials on the
probability of being employed. Ue now turn to some results concerning x^(k)
for preneral n.
x,(k)
2h
L/3
0
X2(k),x (k)
0
k
"k
3;
Figure la. Probability of
employment for the 3-player,
raajority-rule game.
Fi^re lb. Probability of
employment for the 3-player,
. majority-rule game, v/ith 1
veto player.
xjk)
0
10
Figure Ic. Probability of employment
for the 3-player majority rule game
with 2 veto players.
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ProTX3sition 1. Suppose player i has veto power. Then there exists It* such
that x^(k) = 1 for all k ^ k*. An upper bound for k* io given by _s, the size
6f the smallest minimal winning coalition.
Proof* let c-be the number of players with veto power. If s = n, then every
agent has veto power, and c = n as well. Since every agent is equally powerful,
(k) is given by viniform rationing. The cj^itical k* = s in this case.
Suppose then that c < s < n. Let k = s; we wish to show' tht^t
for i having veto pov;er. It suffices to show that i|)V^^(i) >, 1, when k = s.
A veto player i can never join a coalition which is already winning. The
only time his marginal contribution differs from zero is when he is pivotal.
A veto player's expected marginal contribution must be at least as great as
the product of s and his probability of being pivotal:
^^•.Vji(i) > s ^v^(i).
Now if any coalition of size s containing all c veto players is winning,
6
then the power of an individual veto player i is ^v@n by
^Vj(i) = l/c - ((_^l)!(n-c)!)/(n! (s-c-l)!c).
Then _s <|iv^(i) 1, since
(s-c)! n! >j! (n-c)! implies
(^c) ^ (s! (n-c)!)/(n! (^c-l)!) implies
s q > • c.
Finally, suppose not all players without veto power can figure in the smallest
12
sized minimal winning coalition. This makes a veto player even more likely
to pivot. Thus, for employment k = s, and any game v^ with c veto players,
x^(s) = 1. Since the same argument will hold for any k >s, we have shown that
s is the desired "bound.for k*.
ProTXisition 2. Suppose player i is powerless- Then = 0 for k s.
Proof. The only case in which a powerless player makes a positive marginal
contribution is when he joins a tri-nning coalition and the size of that coalition
s < k. If k ^ s, then powerless player i never makes a positive marginal
contribution and his expected marginal contribution (t)V^^(i) = 0.
Comparing these two results, one can see that when employment is power
determined) all players with veto power will be certain to have jobs before
any powerless agent has eVen a i;ositive probability of a job. This is
7
reminiscent of such constructions as Marx's industrial rc:serve army.' The
powerless, like an industrial reserve army, are only called into the production
process as a last resort.
For players i in between the extremes of veto power and powerlessness,
Xj_(k) will in general be an increasing function of k. To stairt with,
will be positive. There are two vjays in which increases in k will raise i's
job prospects. First, i's marginal contribution when he is pivotal will
rise 3S k in min(k,s) rises. Second, when i joins a winning coalition it
is more likely that s < k, and he makes a positive marginal contribution.
For- pXay-:rr. in this power range, x^(k) may never reach 1 before k reaches
n. If does reach 1, it will be after k = _s.
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These two possibilities can be illustrated with a 4-player game. Suppose
the mininal winning coalitions are {1,2} and {l,3i^^) • Player 1 has a veto
but the other players do not. Player 2 is somewhat stronger than 3 or
the distribution of power being (7/l2, 3/l2, l/l2, l/l2). Player 1,
according to Proposition 1, is sure of being employed when k > 2. Player
2 is sure of being employed when k = 3» The two weakest players are sure
to- be employed when k - 4* Figure 2a depicts this result. The weakest
player in the game vjill not be sure of employment until k = n. Somewhat
stronger players have a better chance of being sure of employment as k
approaches n.
A situation very useful in applications is one in which no player has
veto power, no player is powerless, and individual pov/er can take on exactly
tvjo values. This covers for instance societies with two political classes,
one more powerful than the other. The simplest illustration of this situa
tion is the 4-player game with minimal winning coalitions {1,3|4} and {2,3|4}
Mo individual has veto power, but either individual 1 or 2 is more likely
to be pivotal than individual 3 or 4* The distribution of povjer ^Vj
equals (1/3,1/311/6). The employment probabilities for this case are
depicted in figure 2b. Note that no player is sure of employment until k
= n, although a more iX)werful player is always more likely to be employed
than a less ixwerful player.
For n large enough in the 2-class model, the job probabilities Xj^(k) are
approximately linear in k until a neighborhood of k'= n is reached. Indeed,
this latter is an exact result if one uses a model with a continuum of players,
Thus, for mass situations where there is a single significant political
14
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\f'>/
Figure 2a. Employment probabili
ties, l" 1,2} and [1,3,4^
minimal winning.
Figure 2b. Employment probabili
tifes, \ l,3i4 J and52,3,4 j
minimal winning.
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difference, employment probability differentials can be used via linear
estimation to infer political power differentials.
To illustrate the use of this technique, consider the industrial sector
of the Soviet Union during the 1920's. Here was a l-party state, with the
major political difference being whether one belonged to the party or not.
According to Rigby, a worker who belonged to the Communist party stood a l/lOO
chance of being unemployed in 1925 and a l/25 chance of being unemployed in
1927. The latter v/as a year of rather greater overall unemployment.
Unemployment rates among non-party member workers were substantially higher.
8
From data in Rigby, Nove, and official Soviet sources, the following
employment picture emerges:
All Workers
year Total Employed
(in thousands) (in thousands)
1925 10,750 9,800
1927 12,900 11,500
VJorkers Belonginn to the Party
1925 725 718
1927 1,046 1,004
V/orkers not so Belonging
1925 10,025 9,082
1927 11,854 10,496
16
Under the linearity hypothesis, one has
x^Ck) = a(i)k, for i = 1 (Party) and 2 (Nonparty)
Normalizing by n removes the effect of the larger n in the second observation
(1927):
Xj_(k/n) = a(i)k/n.
Both formulations assume that the distribution of power-is the same in the
two years. The data are plotted in figure 3. Being in the party evidently
makes a worker more powerful than otherwise. Indeed, by estimating the
ratio a(l)/a(2)j one can quantify this difference in power. One has
the estimates a(i) = 1,016 and a(2) = .938, hence a ratio of 1.08. Being
a party member,made a worker about o% more powerful than his non-party
cohort. This seemingly small relative advantage would-be enough to account
for his -substantially better chances of finding a job. There is no Tammany
Hall in Moscow, but the Soviets knew the game Senator Marcy had in mind.
x^(k/n)
17
9
x^cyn)
x^(k/n)
/ •'
/
/
/
/
Figure 3. Employnient Probabilities, Party/Nonparty, USSR, as functions
of the employment rate.
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III. Extensions of the Spoils Game
The aim of this section is to show how the Spoils System can serve as
a model for other distributive mechanisms, in particular for those that
distribute bads. Consider the distribution of involuntary service in the
armed forces, the Draft System. He shall show that knowing the probability
that someone gets a job under the Spoils System is tantamount to knowing
the probability that someone avoids the draft under the Draft System,
Suppose as before that there are n agents, each of whom is liable for
military service.' The disutility of serving is -1 for any agent; not serving
has 0 disutility. T;.et the draft quota be k', 0 ^ k' < n. This quota can
be exceeded, although it is not optima] to do so. In any event, it must
be met. The draft quota is exogenous to the political structure. The
representation of the latter in terms of winning coalitions and the game
Vj is as before. The argument for the level-II economic game v^j runs as
follows. If resistance to the draft is futile, then a coalition which is
not winning cannot control the draft. Therefore, it cannot prevent, its
members from being drafted. For a losing coalition then, v'jj-(S) = frs,
the number of its members. If S is winning, it is an entirely different
story. S is then in charge of the draft, and it can draft agents from
outside its own ranks to fill the draft quota. If k' < n-s, the number
of agents not in S, then S fills the quota completeJ.y with outsiders and
none of its members have to serve: v']-j(S) = 0. If k' > n~s, then the
membership of S has to make up the difference; = -(n-s-k'.).
Summarizing the above discussion, one has
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v'ii(S) = -rain(0,n-s-k') if S is winning
-s othen'jise.
Let x*^(k') denote the probability that player i avoids the draft when
the draft quota is k'. The following proposition relates the probability
of avoiding the draft in the same v'jj to the probability of getting a job
in the gaine Vjj.
Proposition 3. x'^(k') = x. (k), when k' + k = n.
Proof. Consider the following linear transformation of v'jj:
v+(S) = v'xi(S) + s.
By the linearity of tlie Shapley value,
f|iv+(i) = ^v'jj(i) + 1.
<\t' the same time, v+ can be written as
v+(S) = nin(s,n-k') if S is winning
0 otherv/ise.
Putting n-k' « k, v4- corresponds to the Spoils System game v^j. In particular,
<Pv+
h-k'
for k'+k = n.
k
Let x+(i) represent the Shapley value allocation for the game v+. Then
i's probability of getting drafted times the disutility of serving =
20
i's probability of getting drafted times (-1) = (})Vjj(i) = x+(i)-l
n-k'
llGTice, one can interpret i's probability of being drafted when the draft
quota is k' with l-x+(i). As just seen,
x+(i) = x^(n~k*).
Thus, the probability of avoiding the draft, , i;<itisfies
x^(k') = l-(l-x+(i)) = Xi(n-k») = x^Ck)
v;hen n-k* = k, as was to be shown.
Proposition 3 shows that all .the results of the Spoils System have
counterparts in the Draft System, Wlien power is evenly distributed, the
probability of avoiding the draft is the same for all. Ulien power is unevenly
distributed, the more powerful stand a better chance of avoiding the draft,
•^foreover, there is a critical draft quota, below which no veto player
stands a chance of being drafted, but above which a powerless player is
sure to be drafted-. The dividing line in these two cases is the draft
quota = n-s, where ^ is the smallest winning coalition.
When resistance to the draft: is not futile, then the strategies involved
become considerably more complicated and the above results must be modified,
A simple illustration will show the difficulties involved. Suppose n=3,
witli {1,2} and {1,3} the minimal winning coalitions. VHien-there is no
resistance to the draft, then the probabilities of being drafted are sho\-m
in figure 4a, which is dual with figure lb. Now suppose that a draftee
21
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can refuse to serve at a cost c < -1. This is worse than serving, but
nevertheless given the draft resister a threat against the coalition
controlling the draft, since one of its own members will have to take his
place at a disutility of -1. Suppose that the quota k* = 1. Then v
= -1. Consider the winning coalition {1,2}. They threaten to draft agent
3, v/ho counters with a threat of his own, to resist the draft. If both
' I
threats are carried out, the utilities to the winning and losing coalitions
are -1 and c respectively. Since v(N) represents the compromise level of
aggregate disutility, the Nash solution to the above bargaining problem
would propose the disutility compromise -l-c/2 and c/2 respectively.
These correspond to the Nash-Harsanyi characteristic function values for
v'j^({l,2} ) and v'jx({3}) when there is draft resistance. The same argument
holds for {1,3} and {2}. I^hen comparing {2,3} versus {l}, neither is
)
winning., However, since all are liable to the draft, in the absence of a
compromise the corresponding disutilities would be -1,-1. The Nash bargain
in this case is ,-1/2,-1/2.
For the specific value c = -1.5, figure 4b shows the draft avoidance
probabilities for all values of the draft quota. Notice the effect of draft
resistance on these probabilities. Players 2 and 3 are less likely to be
drafted than in the no-resistance case. Indeed, as the cost of resistance
approaches -1, so that resistance is no more costly than serving,, the
threat to resist is completely effective and all power differentials
disappear. On the other hand, as the cost of resistance becomes higher,
Probability of
Avoid in:-5 the "Draft
A
%
0
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A
Figure 4a.
Probability of avoiding the draft,
\1,2^ and ^l,3j minimal winning.
Figure 4b.
Probability of avoiding the draft,
with resistance costs = -1.5,
1,2 j and f1,3 J minimal winning.
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the threat to resist looses its credibility. In the limit, one is back
in the no-resi3tance case.
As another example of the versatility of the Spoils model, we consideir..
its implications for the marginal productivity theory of distribution.
Suppose that the production technology is linear in labor L, f(L) = L, and
that each agent has one unit of labor to supply. Only winning coalitions
have access to the production technology. If output is perfectly divisible,
vji satisfies
Vii(S) " s if S is winning
0 otherwise.
According to the marginal productivity theory of distribution, each agent
siiould receive 1 unit of output, the marginal product of his labor. Mow
if the distribution of political power Is even, then this will indeed follow
froTi Shapley value considerations. But if political power is unevenly dis
tributed, then an even distribution of the output is not indicated. A
final 4-player example will make the point. Player 1 has a veto, coalitions
{1,2} and{l,3} arc minimal winning, and player 4 is powerless. The dis
tribution of power 0Vj = (4/6,1/6,1/6,0). The disparities in power show
up in the distribution of output ffv^j « (25/12,9/12,9/12,5/12). Not a
single agent is paid liis marginal product. The veto player gets paid the
most, the powerless player the least. The veto player can certainly expect
to exploit his political power for economic gain. Great disparities of power
jeopardize any theory of distribution which ignores them, a point which
proponents of the marginal productivity theory have perhaps underestimated
24
in the past. It vjould seem that the marginal productivity theory is most
attractive when political power is uniform.
25
' IV, Conclusion
This paper has highlighted the role of power differentials in the
distribution of jobs and the incidence of the draft. A number of restric
tive assumptions have been made in order to make this role clear. The three
most restrictive are the following. First, people and jobs have both been
assumed uniform. Moreover, each agent has been assumed to get the same
utility from each job, A more general model would allow for differences
in jobs and workers.One would conjecture that the more powerful the
agent, the better the job he would get. Second, the structure of power-
has been assumed fixed. However, it is possible that the economic outcome
of one period will change the distribution of power in the next period.
Thus, unemployment in the Soviet Union in the 1920's helped transform the
entire political structure of that period, leaving Stalinist dictatorship
1 9
in its wake. Third, the level of employment and the draft quota have
both been assumed to be exogenous t6 th'e-political structure. Here there
is the possibility that a coalition will win on a platform to change these
1
features of the economy. A model that did justice to these three phenomena
would have to be much more complicated than any presented in this paper.
Whatever the complexity encountered, political power will still manifest
itself in the economic outcome. To the winner go the spoils.
26
FOOT'^ OTES
I. This is argued most forcefully by G. Bettelheim [3J •
2.. See the data quoted in Rigby Cl2, pp. 129-130] .
3. An early example is provided by Shapley and Shubik ClkJ • Aumann and
Shapley £"3!!] contains a comprehensive survey of this field. Gardner f9^ contains
an example of political-economic interaction.
4» An important discussion of veto power and the Shapley value is contained in
Brown [67 .
5. See Shapley fl33 for details.
6. This formula was pointed out to my by D. Blair.
7. See Marx 10, pp. 395-402^ .
8. See Rigby [12' , Nove fll, chapter and 15^ -
9. Details of the strategic reasoning involved here are discussed more fully in
Aumann and Kurz f 2"] .
10. The most general result for convergence of the Shapley value to Competitive
Equilibrium is found in Aumann [1*] .
II. For instance as discussed by Crawford and Knoer I 7^ •
12. Gardner considers the electoral group choice dynamics of this situation.
13. Arecent contribution in this direction is Brito and Intriligator [*5
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